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Abstract—A semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD)
protocol allows a quantum user and a limited “classical”
user to establish a shared secret key secure against an all-
powerful adversary. In this work, we present a new SQKD
protocol where the quantum user is also limited in her
measurement capabilities. We describe the protocol, prove
its security, and show its noise tolerance is as high as “fully
quantum” QKD protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols (see [1]
for a general survey) allow for the establishment of secret
keys between two parties, customarily referred to as
Alice (A) and Bob (B) in a manner secure against even
an all-powerful, unbounded adversary Eve (E) - i.e., an
adversary bounded only by the laws of physics. Achiev-
ing this is impossible through classical communication
alone. QKD protocols require both parties, A and B to
be “quantum” in that they can both manipulate qubits
(or other quantum resources) in certain ways (e.g., both
parties must be able to prepare and/or measure qubits
in two or more bases). Semi-quantum Key Distribution
(SQKD) protocols, which were first introduced in [2] to
study the question “how quantum does a protocol need
to be in order to gain an advantage over its classical
counterpart?” do not impose this requirement on both
users. In the semi-quantum model, one of the users,
typically B, is limited to only operating directly in the
computational Z basis (spanned by |0〉 and |1〉). The
other user, A, is “fully quantum” in that she can prepare
and measure qubits in arbitrary bases.
All SQKD protocols require the use of a two-way
quantum channel, allowing a qubit to travel from fully-
quantum A, to “classical” or semi-quantum B, then back
to A. This also allows an attacker two opportunities to
interact with the traveling qubit, thus greatly increasing
the complexity of their security analysis. In fact, though
several SQKD protocols have been developed, only
Fig. 1. Comparing the original SQKD protocol from [2] (top) to
the “limited-resource” one we analyze here, where Alice’s source and
measurement capabilities have been curtailed (bottom).
recently have unconditional security proofs been derived
[3], [4], [5], [6]. In fact, it was shown in [5] that the
original SQKD protocol of Boyer et al. from [2] has the
same tolerance to noise in the quantum channel as the
fully quantum BB84 [7] protocol.
However, all SQKD protocols we are aware of, and
certainly all protocols with an unconditional proof of
security, require the user A to measure in more than one
basis - typically, she must choose to measure in either
the Z or the Hadamard X basis each iteration (the latter
consisting of states |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)). In this paper,
we propose a very restricted SQKD protocol where the
fully quantum user can only send qubits of the form |0〉,
|1〉, and |+〉 (but not |−〉) and, furthermore, she can only
measure in the X basis. With this protocol, the users are
very limited to what channel statistics they may observe.
See Figure 1 for a schematic diagram of the capabilities
of A and B.
We will prove the unconditional security of this new
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protocol. In our proof, we will utilize multiple chan-
nel statistics, including those gained from mismatched
measurements [8], [9]. Interestingly, as we will show,
our new, limited, protocol is actually insecure without
these statistics (to our knowledge, this is the first time
mismatched measurements have been used to prove the
security of a protocol which is insecure without them
- generally they are used only to improve the key-
rate bound). However, by careful use of mismatched
statistics, we will show, remarkably, that our protocol has
the same noise tolerance as the BB84 protocol, Boyer et
al.’s original SQKD protocol [2], and LM05 [10]!
While there is a clear theoretical interest in studying
these “limited resource” SQKD protocols in order to an-
swer the question “how quantum” need a protocol really
be, there are also potential practical benefits to this study.
For one thing, we show that fewer measurement devices
(which are expensive) are required. Secondly, one could
envision scenarios where equipment potentially breaks
down while in service. If the equipment is installed, say,
on a satellite, it would not only be expensive to repair
or replace the damaged system, but also it would take
time to launch a mission to do so. Our work here shows
how fully-quantum systems, when endowed with the
possibility of two-way quantum communication, could
still be used (as a “semi-quantum” system) should certain
measurement devices fail.
A. Notation
We assume a general understanding of quantum com-
munication and information theory; for more information
on these, the reader is referred to [11]. In this section,
we will describe the notation used throughout the paper.
We denote by H(p1, · · · , pn) = −∑i pi log pi to be the
Shannon entropy (all logarithms in this paper are base
2 unless otherwise noted). If n = 2, then we simply
write h(p1) = h(p2), the binary entropy function. If ρ
is a density operator (a positive semi-definite Hermitian
operator of unit trace) acting on some finite dimensional
Hilbert space H (in this case ρ models a quantum
system), then we write S(ρ) to mean the von Neumann
entropy of ρ which is simply S(ρ) = H(λ1, · · · , λm)
where the λi’s are the eigenvalues of ρ. We write ρAB
to mean a density operator acting on some joint Hilbert
space HA ⊗ HB and ρB to mean the partial trace over
HA (i.e., ρB = trAρAB is an operator acting on HB).
We use S(A|B)ρ to mean the conditional von Neumann
entropy of A’s system conditioned on B’s, namely:
S(A|B)ρ = S(AB)ρ − S(B)ρ = S(ρAB) − S(ρB). Often we
will forgo writing the subscript “ρ” when the context is
clear.
The computational Z basis are states {|0〉 , |1〉} and
the Hadamard X basis are denoted by states {|+〉 , |−〉},
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Given a vector |v〉, we write
v to mean |v〉 〈v | = vv∗. Similarly, 0 = |0〉 〈0| and 1 =
|1〉 〈1|, and so on. Also, we write 0A to mean |0〉 〈0|
acting on A’s Hilbert space (and similarly for iA and
iB).
II. THE PROTOCOL
The protocol we analyze is semi-quantum and, so, B
being the “classical” user, is able only to work directly
with the computational Z basis. Namely, B on receiving
a qubit from A, is allowed to perform one of two
operations: 1: he may Measure and Resend: that is, he
will subject the incoming qubit to a measurement in
the Z = {|0〉 , |1〉} basis. If this measurement results in
outcome |r〉, for r ∈ {0, 1}, he will send the qubit |r〉
back to A; or 2: he may Reflect: that is, he will ignore
the incoming qubit, and “bounce” or reflect it back to A.
In this case, B does not disturb the state of the qubit, but
also does not learn anything about its state (essentially
A is talking to herself in this case).
The other user, A, is allowed to prepare arbitrary
qubits and to perform arbitrary qubit measurements.
However, in this paper, unlike prior semi-quantum pro-
tocols, we will place a further restriction on A in that she
is only able to measure in the X basis. We do, however,
allow A to send qubits in either basis, however we will
only require her to send three states: |0〉, |1〉, or |+〉. In
a way, this protocol may be considered a limited version
of the three state SQKD protocol described in [12]; here,
however, we require that A measure only in the X basis
(the protocol in [12] permitted her to measure in both
bases). The protocol is described in Protocol 1.
A. Security of QKD Protocols
We first consider security against collective attacks
[1] whereby E attacks each signal independently and
identically but is allowed to postpone her joint quantum
measurement until later. We will later consider security
against general attacks (thus unconditional security).
Let N be the size of the raw key after A and B perform
the quantum communication stage of an (S)QKD proto-
col. This is a classical string that is partially correlated
and partially secret. A and B will perform an error
correction protocol (leaking additional information to
E) followed by a privacy amplification protocol. The
end result is a secret key of size `(N). It was shown
in [13] that the key rate, denoted r , of such a process
in the asymptotic scenario is: r := limN→∞ `(N )N =
inf[S(A|E) − H(A|B)], where the infimum is over all
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Protocol 1 Limited-SQKD
Quantum Communication Stage: The quantum com-
munication stage of the protocol repeats the following
process:
1.) With probability p/2 A sends |0〉; with probability
p/2 she sends |1〉, with probability 1 − p, she sends |+〉
2.) B chooses, with probability q, to measure and resend
or, with probability 1−q to reflect the qubit. If he chooses
the former, he saves his measurement result to potentially
serve as his raw key bit for this iteration.
3.) A measures the returning qubit in the X basis.
4.) Using the authenticated classical channel, A divulges
her initial choice of basis and B his choice of operation.
5.) If A chose to send in the Z basis and if B chose
to measure and resend, they may use this iteration to
contribute to their raw key (A using her initial prepa-
ration choice and B his measurement outcome). All
other iterations, along with a suitably sized, randomly
chosen subset of iterations of the former kind, may be
used to estimate the channel statistics. Note that we will
not discard iterations: indeed, as we will see, the use
of mismatched measurements [8], [9] will be vital to
proving the security of this limited SQKD protocol and
without them, the protocol is in fact insecure.
collective attacks which induce the observed statistics.
Our goal, then, is to determine a lower-bound on our
protocol’s key rate as a function only on observed
parameters. We are particularly interested in determining
for what noise levels is r positive - i.e., we wish to
determine how noisy the quantum channel can be before
the key rate drops to zero.
B. On the Need for Mismatched Measurements
In this subsection we show Protocol 1 is actually
insecure if A and B limit their parameter estimation only
to considering “error events” (e.g., a |+〉 flipping to a
|−〉 when B reflects). We show a very simple attack E
may perform, which induces no noise, yet causes her to
gain full information on the raw key. This attack may be
detected by considering mismatched measurement events
[8], [9] (e.g., a |0〉 being measured by A as a |+〉).
The attack strategy proceeds as follows: in the forward
channel, E will ignore the qubit - thus there will be no
Z basis noise (we make the usual assumption that any
noise is the result of the attacker [1]). In the reverse
channel, E will apply a unitary operator UR acting on
the qubit and E’s private memory as follows:
UR |+, 0〉 = |+, 0〉 UR |−, 0〉 = |+, 1〉 ,
where the first subspace is the qubit and the second is
E’s quantum ancilla which we assume is initially cleared
to some “zero” state |0〉 (this is a collective attack).
It is clear that the above is a unitary operator. Further-
more, it induces no X basis noise - since A cannot send
|−〉, this attack goes undetected. However, by linearity
of UR, we have:
UR |0, 0〉 = |+,+〉 UR |1, 0〉 = |+,−〉 .
Thus, if B measures and resends, a simple measurement
of E’s ancilla in the X basis provides her with full
information on the raw key bit of B (and thus also A).
This attack also goes undetected.
One could foil this attack by having A send also a
|−〉 in which case the above attack would induce an
X basis error rate of 50%. However, we may also foil
the above attack, without altering the quantum portion
of our protocol (i.e., without increasing the quantum
complexity of the protocol), by considering mismatched
measurements.
Indeed, the idea is as follows: if there were no attack
in the reverse channel, one would expect A to observe
|+〉 or |−〉 with equal probability in the event B chose to
measure and resend. UR, however, causes A to always
measure |+〉 and so would be detected.
Obviously, UR is just one explicit attack which we
constructed to illustrate the sensitivity of this new pro-
tocol. In the following, we will derive a lower-bound on
the key rate of our protocol, applicable for any attack.
C. Proof of Security
Our goal now is to determine a bound on the key
rate of Protocol 1 based only on statistics that may be
observed directly by A and B. To do so, we must first
describe the joint quantum system held by A and B in
the event a particular iteration was used to contribute
towards their raw key. In particular, in the event A sends
a Z basis state and B measures and resends. We first
consider collective attacks; later, we will discuss security
against arbitrary, general attacks.
In the following we will denote by HT to be the two-
dimensional Hilbert space modeling the traveling qubit
(i.e., it is the “transit” space) while HE is the, without
loss of generality, finite-dimensional Hilbert space mod-
eling E’s quantum memory. As we are considering, for
the time being, collective attacks, we may describe E’s
collective attack as a pair of unitary operators (UF,UR)
where UF is applied in the forward direction (as the
qubit travels from A to B) and where UR is applied
in the reverse (as the qubit travels from B back to
A). Furthermore, we may assume that E’s ancilla is
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cleared to some pure “zero” state |0〉E . Therefore, we
may write the action of E’s attack operators as follows:
UF |0, 0〉TE = |0, e0〉 + |1, e1〉; UF |1, 0〉TE = |0, e2〉 +
|1, e3〉; and UR |i, ej〉TE = |0, e0i, j〉 + |1, e1i, j〉 ; where
the various |ei〉 and |eki, j〉 are arbitrary, not necessarily
normalized nor orthogonal, states in E’s ancilla HE .
Unitarity of UF and UR impose various restrictions on
these states which will become important later.
With the above notation described, we may now derive
the joint quantum system modeling a single iteration of
the protocol, conditioning on events leading to a key bit
being distilled (so as to compute the key rate equation).
Conditioning on the event this iteration is used to con-
tribute towards the raw key, it holds that A sends |0〉 or
|1〉 with probability 1/2 each. E subsequently attacks the
qubit using UF , and then forwards the qubit to B who
measures it in the Z basis, resending his measurement
result as a new qubit. This qubit is again captured by
E who attacks with UR. Finally, A performs an X basis
measurement, discarding the result (effectively tracing
out HT ). Thus, the desired system, denoted ρABE , is:
1
2
0A0B ⊗ (e00,0 + e10,0) +
1
2
0A1B ⊗ (e01,1 + e11,1)
+
1
2
1A0B ⊗ (e00,2 + e10,2) +
1
2
1A1B ⊗ (e01,3 + e11,3).
We now use Theorem 1 of [5] to bound S(A|E) as
follows:
S(A|E) ≥
〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 + 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉
2
· ∆1 (1)
+
〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 + 〈e01,3 |e01,3〉
2
· ∆2
+
〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 + 〈e00,2 |e00,2〉
2
· ∆3
+
〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 + 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉
2
· ∆4
where:
∆1 = h
( 〈e00,0 |e00,0〉
〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 + 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉
)
− h(λ1) (2)
∆2 = h
( 〈e10,0 |e10,0〉
〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 + 〈e01,3 |e01,3〉
)
− h(λ2) (3)
∆3 = h
( 〈e11,1 |e11,1〉
〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 + 〈e00,2 |e00,2〉
)
− h(λ3) (4)
∆4 = h
( 〈e01,1 |e01,1〉
〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 + 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉
)
− h(λ4) (5)
and:
λ1 =
1
2
+
√
(〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 − 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉)2 + 4Re2 〈e00,0 |e11,3〉
2(〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 + 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉)
(6)
λ2 =
1
2
+
√
(〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 − 〈e01,3 |e01,3〉)2 + 4Re2 〈e10,0 |e01,3〉
2(〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 + 〈e01,3 |e01,3〉)
(7)
λ3 =
1
2
+
√
(〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 − 〈e00,2 |e00,2〉)2 + 4Re2 〈e11,1 |e00,2〉
2(〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 + 〈e00,2 |e00,2〉)
(8)
λ4 =
1
2
+
√
(〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 − 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉)2 + 4Re2 〈e01,1 |e10,2〉
2(〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 + 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉)
(9)
We now show how parameter estimation may be
used to determine bounds on the various inner-products
needed to evaluate this lower-bound on S(A|E). We
will also take advantage of information learned through
mismatched measurements (which, as discussed earlier,
is actually critical to the security of this protocol). In
[5], these statistics were used to evaluate the key rate
of Boyer et al.’s [2] original SQKD protocol. We will
extend the results from that paper and apply them to our
new protocol. The difficulty is that A is not allowed to
measure in the Z basis, thus limiting the information we
can learn (unlike in [5] where A was allowed to measure
in any basis of her choice).
Denote by pA→Bi, j to be the probability that if A sends|i〉 (for i ∈ {0, 1,+}) then B measures | j〉 (for j ∈ {0, 1}).
It is obvious that A and B may observe these probabilities
for all combinations of i and j. In particular, we clearly
have: pA→B0,0 = 〈e0 |e0〉 = 〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 + 〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 (the
last equality follows from unitarity of UR). Since each
〈eki, j |eki, j〉 ≥ 0, this gives us a bound on these inner-
products. Similar restrictions for the other 〈eki, j |eki, j〉 may
be found based on the observable quantity pA→B
a,b
.
What remains to be shown is how to determine bounds
on those quantities appearing inside the λi expressions.
Denote by pA→A
i, j,k
to be the probability that A measures
|k〉 conditioning on the event A initially sent |i〉 and B
measured (and thus resent) outcome | j〉. Here we have
i ∈ {0, 1,+}, j ∈ {0, 1} and k ∈ {+,−}. Also, denote by
pA→A
i,R,k
to be the probability that, if A initially sends |i〉,
and if B reflects, than A measures |k〉.
Consider, first, the quantity QX = pA→A+,R,−: the proba-
bility of a |+〉 flipping to a |−〉 if B reflects (note that
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the users may not measure pA→A−,R,+ as A is not allowed to
send the state |−〉). In the event B reflects, his operation
is, essentially, the identity operator. Thus, we may think
of E’s attack as a single operator V = URUF ; that is,
A sends a qubit, E attacks with V , and A measures a
qubit. Recalling that E’s memory is cleared to some
“zero” state at the start of each iteration, let us denote
V’s action as follows: V |0, 0〉TE = |0, g0〉 + |1, g1〉; and
V |1, 0〉TE = |0, g2〉 + |1, g3〉 ; where, due to linearity of
the operators UF and UR, we find:
|g0〉 = |e00,0〉 + |e01,1〉 |g1〉 = |e10,0〉 + |e11,1〉 (10)
|g2〉 = |e00,2〉 + |e01,3〉 |g3〉 = |e10,2〉 + |e11,3〉
Due to linearity of V , we easily find:
QX =
1
2
− 1
2
Re(〈g0 |g1〉 + 〈g0 |g3〉 + 〈g1 |g2〉 + 〈g2 |g3〉).
(11)
(Note that, above, we made use of the fact that 〈g0 |g2〉+
〈g1 |g3〉 = 0 due to unitarity of V .)
Let us first consider 〈g0 |g1〉 and 〈g2 |g3〉. As demon-
strated in [5], the statistics pA→A0,R,+ and p
A→A
1,R,+ can be used
to determine these quantities. In particular:
pA→A0,R,+ =
1
2
(〈g0 |g0〉 + 〈g1 |g1〉 + 2Re 〈g0 |g1〉)
⇒Re 〈g0 |g1〉 = pA→A0,R,+ −
1
2
, (12)
where, for the second derivation, we used the fact that
〈g0 |g0〉+ 〈g1 |g1〉 = 1, due to unitarity of V . Furthermore,
note that if E’s attack is symmetric in that pA→A0,R,+ = 1/2,
then Re 〈g0 |g1〉 = 0. However, we do not require this
symmetry assumption.
Similarly, we may derive the following:
Re 〈g2 |g3〉 = pA→A1,R,+ −
1
2
. (13)
Let us now turn our gaze to the remaining two
quantities Re 〈g0 |g3〉 and Re 〈g1 |g2〉, from which we will
acquire bounds on the desired quantities appearing in the
λi . From Equation 10, we may expand these “g” states
in terms of “e” states:
〈g0 |g3〉 =
Λ1︷     ︸︸     ︷
〈e00,0 |e11,3〉 + 〈e00,0 |e10,2〉 +
Λ4︷     ︸︸     ︷
〈e01,1 |e10,2〉 + 〈e01,1 |e11,3〉
〈g1 |g2〉 = 〈e10,0 |e01,3〉︸     ︷︷     ︸
Λ2
+ 〈e10,0 |e00,2〉 + 〈e11,1 |e00,2〉︸     ︷︷     ︸
Λ3
+ 〈e11,1 |e01,3〉
where, above, we defined Λi to be that inner product
required to compute λi .
From [5], we know that:
η1 = Re 〈e00,0 |e10,2〉 + 〈e10,0 |e00,2〉 (14)
= 2pA→B+,0 p
A→A
+,0,+ −
1
2
(pA→B0,0 + pA→B1,0 )
− pA→B0,0
(
pA→A0,0,+ −
1
2
)
− pA→B1,0
(
pA→A1,0,+ −
1
2
)
− pA→B+,0 +
1
2
(pA→B0,0 + pA→B1,0 ).
η2 = Re 〈e01,1 |e11,3〉 + 〈e11,1 |e01,3〉 (15)
= 2pA→B+,1 p
A→A
+,1,+ −
1
2
(pA→B0,1 + pA→B1,1 )
− pA→B0,1
(
pA→A0,1,+ −
1
2
)
− pA→B1,1
(
pA→A1,1,+ −
1
2
)
+ pA→B+,0 −
1
2
(pA→B0,0 + pA→B1,0 ).
The above expressions are easily discovered by tracing
the evolution of a qubit |+〉 as it is attacked by E , then
measured by B (conditioning on a particular outcome),
attacked by E again, and finally measured in the X basis
by A. Even though the protocol considered in [5], from
which the above identities were derived, did not involve
a limited A, these quantities are all based on statistics
which may be observed in our limited case as none
require A to measure in a non-X basis.
At this point, we already have enough information to
numerically evaluate our lower bound with surprisingly
good results. Indeed, the (eight) variables we optimize
over are:
〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 , 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉 , 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉 , 〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 , {Λi}4i=1
subject to the following restrictions (also listed are the
reasons for the given restrictions):
Restriction Reason
〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 = pA→B0,0 − 〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 Unitarity of UR
〈e01,3 |e01,3〉 = pA→B1,1 − 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉 Unitarity of UR
〈e00,2 |e00,2〉 = pA→B1,0 − 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉 Unitarity of UR
〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 = pA→B0,1 − 〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 Unitarity of UR
|Λ1 | ≤
√
〈e00,0 |e00,0〉 〈e11,3 |e11,3〉 Cauchy Schwarz
|Λ2 | ≤
√
〈e10,0 |e10,0〉 〈e01,3 |e01,3〉 Cauchy Schwarz
|Λ3 | ≤
√
〈e11,1 |e11,1〉 〈e00,2 |e00,2〉 Cauchy Schwarz
|Λ4 | ≤
√
〈e01,1 |e01,1〉 〈e10,2 |e10,2〉 Cauchy Schwarz
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And, finally, one further restriction required by Equation
11 combined with Equations 12, 13, 14, and 15:
QX = 1 − 12 (Λ1 + Λ2 + Λ3 + Λ4 + η1 + η2) (16)
− 1
2
(pA→A0,R,+ + pA→A1,R,+)
We numerically optimize Equation 1 subject to the
above restrictions for various levels of noise. We con-
sider two common scenarios to illustrate our bound
(though, our bound is applicable to any two-way qubit
channel): first, the two quantum channels are mod-
eled as independent depolarization channels whereby
QX = 2Q(1 − Q) and Q is the Z basis error rate in
the forward (and, independently, the reverse) channel;
secondly, the two channels are modeled as dependent
channels whereby QX = Q. In the first case, we attain
a noise tolerance of 7.9% (i.e., the key rate expression
is positive for all Q ≤ 7.9%). In the second, we attain
a noise tolerance of 11%. The tolerance in both these
scenarios is exactly the same as the original Boyer et al.,
SQKD protocol without restrictions on A! This is also
the same noise tolerance that BB84 could suffer with
these noise parameters [14] and also the fully-quantum
LM05 QKD protocol [15]. The user A may therefore
utilize a simpler device compared to the original Boyer et
al., protocol; alternatively, if A is equipped with multiple
measurement devices, and the Z measurement device
fails during operation, it may still be possible to do QKD
between the two users.
Note that the above analysis assumed collective at-
tacks. However, this protocol may be made permutation
invariant in the usual way (e.g., by publicly choosing
a random permutation and permuting the raw key). In
this case, the results from [16], [17] apply and we attain
security against general attacks (and thus unconditional
security). Indeed, we may perform the above security
analysis under an equivalent entanglement based version
of the protocol whereby A prepares a maximally entan-
gled state and B’s measurement operation is modeled as
a CNOT operation.
III. CLOSING REMARKS
We have taken the semi-quantum protocol of Boyer
et al. [2], removed A’s ability to measure in any basis
other than the X-basis, proved its security, and have
shown that, despite this limitation, it can suffer the same
amount of noise as the original SQKD protocol and
also “fully quantum” protocols. An obvious question for
future work would be: can we restrict A’s capabilities
even further (where A sends fewer than three states)? It
would also be interesting to analyze (and compare) the
key rate in the finite key setting.
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